Richard Bissell: The Overhead Economist

Lt Col Matt Sanchez, USAF - Assessments Action Officer, Joint Staff

Josh Zavilla, Head of National Security, Palantir

Unlike Kelly Johnson, Richard Mervin Bissell Jr. is probably a name that does not immediately come to mind when you think of the phrase “overhead reconnaissance.” Yet, during the first decade of the Cold War, Richard Bissell changed the face of overhead reconnaissance, particularly as the Jet Age started to modernize US combat employment and intelligence collection. Cutting edge systems, like the Lockheed U-2 spyplane, the A-11/A-12 Oxcart test articles (precursors to the SR-71 Blackbird), and the first space-based imagery program, CORONA, can all be attributed to Bissell. Compared to the well-known pioneers of industry, like Johnson, Bissell’s life started as an academic that then moved into the shadows as a CIA employee. But for every successful national security innovator in industry, you need a government counterpart also willing to innovate and find ways to get through the status quo.

Born on September 18, 1909, in Hartford, Connecticut, Bissell was not an engineer or pilot. He pursued an academic career in economics, earning his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. His early career was marked by significant contributions to economic policy and his role in administering the Marshall Plan, which was crucial in rebuilding Europe after World War II.

After his success with the Marshall Plan, Bissell returned to the United States and became involved with various government projects. His reputation for effective management and innovative solutions caught the attention of key figures in the U.S. government, including Allen Dulles, who was then the Director of the CIA. Dulles recognized Bissell’s potential and recruited him to join the CIA in 1954, initially to work on economic intelligence. However, Bissell’s skills quickly found a new application in the burgeoning field of aerial reconnaissance. He ran three critical programs in this field during his time at CIA.

U-2: A Case Study in Breaking Bureaucracy

With World War II and events like Pearl Harbor still fresh in our collective memory, the US fixation with strategic surprise, attack, and deterrence emerged. President Eisenhower’s establishment of technical capabilities and intelligence panels leaned on America’s industrial expertise to redefine overhead collection intelligence. The US Air Force and CIA first came up with the concept of an overhead spy plane in early 1954, and before the end of the year, President Eisenhower gave the green light to Bissell to start building.

The first question was “how do we do this quickly”? The typical Air Force acquisition process was fraught with bureaucratic red tape, exhaustive requirements, and lengthy timelines. Bissell recognized that these constraints would be detrimental to the urgent need for reconnaissance capabilities during the Cold War. The traditional processes involved extensive documentation, multiple layers of approval, and rigid adherence to predefined requirements, all of which would delay the development and deployment of what would be called the U-2.

U-2 Spy Plane, Source

To circumvent these obstacles, Bissell adopted a radically different approach by focusing on outcomes rather than rigid requirements. He employed a prototype and bake-off strategy, where several companies pitched designs, and competed them for government selection. This method allowed for iterative improvements and quick decision-making, bypassing the slow-moving traditional procurement system. The bakeoff strategy shifted the burden of innovation to the experts in American industry, and allowed the government to focus on selecting the prototype that would best meet the objectives on the fast timeline they needed.

This doesn’t just encourage innovation, it encourages speed. The first operational prototype of the U-2 was ready in 9 months and was fully operational within 20 months. But in the Cold War, we needed to keep moving to stay in front of our adversaries. They were gaining capability and Bissell recognized the need to do the same.

A-12 Oxcart: Don’t Just Build the U-3

Bissell recognized that incremental improvements were insufficient; a fundamentally new platform was necessary to address evolving threats and intelligence requirements. While most government programs start with an existing, operational design and attempt to retrofit capabilities into that design, Bissell and his team recognized they needed a stepwise change to keep ahead of the Russians.

Authorized in 1959, the A-12 Oxcart was designed to fly higher and faster than the U-2, with speeds exceeding Mach 3 and altitudes of 90,000 feet, making it nearly invulnerable to enemy defenses. Shortly after its approval, the downing of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 in 1960 emphasized that Bissell was correct in his assessment and they again needed a quick-to-deploy capability to maintain the US’s advantage. He turned to Kelly Johnson, who helped him turn a success.

Lockheed A-12 Oxcart, Source

The Oxcart program faced numerous challenges, from developing new materials that could withstand extreme speeds and temperatures to creating advanced propulsion systems. Bissell’s leadership ensured that these challenges were met with innovative solutions. He fostered a culture of experimentation and rapid prototyping, enabling the development of technologies that were far ahead of their time. The first flight of the A-12 took place in April 1962, and its successor, the SR-71 Blackbird, would go on to become an iconic symbol of American aerospace ingenuity.

CORONA: Pursuing Parallel Paths to Success

At the same time, Bissell recognized the importance of placing a few big bets that employed different approaches to ensure the most critical needs could be met and that the US could maintain technical superiority. To do that, starting in 1956, he led the development of the first satellite photoreconnaissance system, CORONA, providing global coverage and overcoming the limitations of aircraft-based reconnaissance.

CORONA involved significant technical and logistical challenges, including the development of film recovery capsules that could withstand reentry and be retrieved mid-air by a moving aircraft. Again, an economist by trade, Bissell surrounded himself with industry experts and let a combination of government and industry experts drive the innovation with government managing toward the outcomes via “show me”-style experimentation. In 1958, the program was approved and funded.

Over 18 months, the program had 13 failed experiments (including failed launches, failure to achieve orbit, and failed capsule recoveries). This didn’t kill the program, but led to a successful 14th mission, just two years after funding was approved.

This first successful CORONA mission marked a revolutionary advancement in intelligence-gathering, providing invaluable data on Soviet military capabilities and changing the landscape of reconnaissance. It wasn’t just about building another U-2, but about building a second transformational capability that complemented the US’s strategy and filled a niche that the U-2 could not fill. By the time of its declassification in 1995, the CORONA program had produced over 800,000 images and set in motion a half-century of overhead collection techniques.

Under the now-declassified National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the CORONA lineage has morphed into ever-persistent overhead collection using sensors in space (“national technical means” in today’s lingo). Meanwhile, CORONA’s legacy is also visible in the commercial space industry, where dozens of companies build, launch, and operate satellites across sensor modalities and then sell relevant data to the NRO. Bissell would likely be shocked.

An aircraft performs a mid-air retrieval to recover a CORONA film capsule. Source

Conclusion

Richard Bissell's legacy is a testament to his relentless pursuit of innovation and his ability to challenge the status quo in American intelligence and aeronautics. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Bissell was not satisfied with incremental improvements. He sought transformative changes that would redefine overhead reconnaissance and keep the United States at the forefront of intelligence capabilities.

As a government executive and program manager, Bissell's approach was instrumental in enabling industry pioneers (like Kelly Johnson) to succeed. By circumventing traditional Air Force acquisition processes, introducing bake-offs and rapid prototyping, and fostering a culture where failing fast was a necessary step toward groundbreaking success, he accelerated the deployment of critical reconnaissance capabilities and set new standards for innovation in government procurement.

Bissell's visionary strategies not only expedited the development of vital technologies but also demonstrated the power of effective government-industry collaboration in achieving national security objectives. His contributions have left an indelible mark on the field, proving that bold, unconventional thinking can yield extraordinary outcomes in the high-stakes arena of international intelligence and defense.

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The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.