Closing the Cash Chain: Why the DoD’s Biggest Risk Isn’t the Kill Chain
Our two year Fiscal OODA loop is not survivable
In a world where speed, agility, and flexibility determine success in warfare, the Department of Defense (DoD) finds itself trapped in a bureaucratic quagmire—the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. This outdated system, originally designed for an era when conformity and predictability were valued over creativity, now stifles the agility our military desperately needs. To put it bluntly: the DoD’s inability to close the “cash chain” is crippling our ability to either kill programs that don’t work or scale those that do. The "cash chain" refers to the DoD and Congress’s ability to rapidly and flexibly allocate, reallocate, or eliminate funding across programs to align with mission needs, enabling swift adjustments in response to emerging threats and opportunities.
The current PPBE process isn’t a problem confined to some dusty corner of the Pentagon. It’s a national security crisis. John Boyd’s famous OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and the concept of the kill chain emphasize quick, decisive action to outmaneuver adversaries. But let’s be clear: in today's strategic environment—where Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang are reshaping the global order—the real bottleneck isn’t in tactical operational execution. It’s in how quickly you can move funds around and get started delivering capability. The DoD and Congress are excellent at talking about the use of new technologies or eliminating programs, but when it comes time to fund and field these innovations or eliminate a program at a pace that matters, we stumble. The PPBE process—the Pentagon’s 60-plus-year approach to budgeting—moves at a glacial pace, effectively creating a "Valley of Death" for promising technologies.
There’s been a lot of talk about the Valley of Death—the chasm between developing promising new technologies and actually scaling them. And make no mistake, that valley is real. But it’s not caused by a lack of innovation; it’s caused by our inability to quickly move money where it needs to go. The DoD’s current budgeting system is slow, rigid, and incapable of responding to the dynamic nature of modern conflict.
Two of our three branches of government and much of our defense industrial base remain shackled to the sluggish PPBE system, which has built an ecosystem of organizations, processes, and incentives that limit our military’s competitive edge. Congressional appropriators cling to their influence and control over defense spending, while DoD acquisition managers and program executives are promoted simply for keeping programs alive, even if they barely progress. Meanwhile, defense contractors are rewarded with additional resources when projects fall behind on cost and schedule, as the DoD struggles to salvage some return on its investment. This cycle stifles agility and innovation, leaving us increasingly vulnerable to competitors.
It doesn’t have to be this way. The DoD and Congress can modernize the cash chain while maintaining accountability, transparency, and accuracy. Critics argue that injecting speed into budgeting risks losing oversight. But the opposite is true. Agile funding practices—those that allow for quick pivots—can be more transparent because they force decision-makers to assess and reassess programs in real time, just as Boyd’s OODA Loop demands.
For 15 years, I was part of this system, working within the Pentagon and witnessing firsthand how difficult it is to move money where and when it’s needed most. When I studied economics at Bates College, two principles stuck with me: there is no free lunch, and sunk cost. The latter became my professional mantra in ways I couldn’t have predicted. The concept of sunk costs—an expense that's already been incurred and you will never get back, thus should be excluded from decision-making—was a lesson I applied more often than I ever imagined, especially within the DoD’s bureaucracy.
During my time at the Pentagon, I learned that the hardest thing wasn’t delivering new capabilities—it was killing programs that weren’t working. One of the most challenging experiences of my career was shutting down a retired annuitant pay system that hadn’t delivered results in over a decade—and, by the way, had no users. Additionally, I had to shut down an artificial intelligence (AI) development environment that cost $50 million a year, had fewer than 20 users, and created only one AI model in 3 years, despite being duplicative of other more successful AI programs. The PPBE system, as it was designed, favors incumbent activities and programs. The inertia was staggering. That inertia coupled with the institutional constituencies each program has—managers, beneficiaries, vendors—meant it took numerous reviews, approvals, and layers of oversight to finally kill something that had already been funded across the Fiscal Year Defense Program (FYDP) and seemed to be always “just one year away” from delivering. Yet, despite its failures, the idea of letting go—of recognizing that the sunk cost was unrecoverable—was incredibly hard for the organization to accept.
This mindset is pervasive in the DoD and Congress, where programs can exist long past their usefulness simply because of how difficult it is to reallocate funds. The PPBE process is built around long cycles and deep entrenchments. Once a program is funded, it becomes nearly impossible to divert resources away, even if it clearly isn't delivering results. This inability to kill programs wastes valuable resources that could be redirected to initiatives with more promise. I took pride in not just what I delivered in my time at the Pentagon, but in what I managed to kill (which unfortunately was not much)—because in doing so, we freed up resources for programs that were making a difference.
I was fortunate to have worked within the DoD Comptroller’s office and knew the ins and outs of the system like few others. That deep understanding of the PPBE process was key to my ability to navigate the bureaucratic labyrinth. I had incredible mentors and bosses in CAPE, the Comptroller’s Office, and the Deputy Secretary's Office who helped me understand how to find solutions and work around the barriers that prevented progress. Without that knowledge—and without those leaders—running an effective program would have been impossible. But what happens to program leaders who don’t have the same level of access or institutional knowledge? The system isn’t designed to support agility, and that’s where reform is desperately needed.
Even success had its own pitfalls. When I led the Advana program—the largest Federal enterprise data and analytics environment—we built our budget around two-year cycles. But the reality of the world is unpredictable. When we drafted our budget, we had no way of knowing that COVID-19, the Afghanistan Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, the Russia-Ukraine war, or the significant push for DoD-wide decision advantage would occur. We scaled the program to meet these challenges, growing far beyond what anyone had predicted. The more success we had, the more criticism we faced. The team and our customers delivered more use cases, expanded our customer base, and solved critical operational challenges—but because we exceeded the budget planned two years prior, I was told by an acquisition executive in my own organization that I was “the worst program executive in DoD history.” Which in this case I took as an honorable achievement.
Why? Because the team was wildly successful, beyond what anyone predicted. The reward for the team and me was a swift kick in the face for not demonstrating conformist control. Not because we failed, but because we didn’t stay confined to a budget that was crafted long before these crises and new priorities unfolded. The PPBE process failed to recognize the importance of flexibility in managing a dynamic environment. Fortunately, with the help of experienced leadership from the Comptroller and amazing customers, we managed to continue delivering value. But not everyone in the DoD is so lucky.
Budgeting, like planning, is invaluable. A static budget, like a static plan, is useless. Mike Tyson taught us, "Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face," a mantra that resonates in both combat and budgeting. Budgets are a type of plan, and no plan survives first contact. Flexibility and real-time adjustments are essential to operational success. Imagine a future where the DoD could close the cash chain with the same velocity that it closes the kill chain. This would mean moving from innovation to scale in months, not years. It would mean having the flexibility to rapidly allocate funds to new technologies or reallocate resources away from outdated programs. The PPBE Reform Commission has highlighted many of these issues, and its recommendations provide a path forward for reform.
The PPBE Reform Commission report, which I strongly recommend everyone read, offers crucial insights into modernizing the DoD’s budget process. With recommendations like increasing reprogramming flexibility, establishing a multiyear budget framework, mitigating the impacts of Continuing Resolutions (CRs), and allowing software funding across appropriations, the Commission has laid a roadmap to enable the DoD to operate with the speed, agility, and accountability our national defense demands in an era of great power competition. However, while I am optimistic about the potential implementation of these recommendations, it will take years before these reforms come to fruition (if they do at all). In the meantime, there are immediate steps we can take to drive meaningful results and deliver capability faster. Here are six practices that have proven effective in overcoming the systemic inertia of the PPBE process based on my experience:
1. Harness Internal Competition to Drive Excellence
Working in the DoD, one of my best experiences was being part of the “data platform wars” between programs like Advana, Envision (Air Force), Vantage (Army), and VAULT (Air Force). The question that usually came up was, “Why do we have so many data platforms?” But that’s the wrong focus. Instead, we should ask, “How can we develop the most effective platforms to achieve decision advantage?” This internal competition, often perceived as redundant, was actually a catalyst for innovation. It pushed each program to evolve rapidly, sharpening our capabilities and bringing the DoD closer to true decision superiority. With minimal investment, this rivalry drove significant progress. The takeaway? Embrace competition and let the best ideas and capabilities lead the way.
2. Embrace Sunk Cost as Opportunities for Growth
Recognizing when to let go has been one of the toughest challenges within the Department and Congress, and I wish I had done more to end programs that no longer delivered value. We should actively reward those who recommend ending their own programs when they see a better use for resources elsewhere. Too often, admitting a project’s failure is seen as a career risk, leading to inefficiencies that drain resources. Redirecting funds isn’t failure—it’s a critical step toward agility and innovation delivery. Embracing sunk costs as a chance to learn and refocus is essential for keeping the DoD adaptive and responsive in a rapidly changing world.
3. Name Someone Who is Accountable to Drive Results and Give Them the Proper Authorities
One of the peculiar aspects of the DoD’s structure is the division of responsibility within programs. Typically, the “functional” team is tasked with creating requirements and securing funding, while the “program management” team handles execution and delivery to end-users. This split means that, in practice, no single entity is fully accountable for the mission’s success. During my tenure, I was fortunate to hold both functional and programmatic responsibilities for a single program, giving me the authority to make decisions and the accountability for outcomes. Having unified control enabled us to move with speed, make real-time adjustments, and ensure that our programs truly delivered. In a system as complex as the DoD, naming a person who is accountable and empowered for an outcome isn’t just effective—it’s essential for operational agility and mission success.
4. Institutionalize Real-Time, Data-Driven Evaluation for Impact
To drive real accountability, the DoD should implement a real-time, data-driven evaluation process that rewards program managers not just for scaling successful initiatives, but also for the strategic termination of underperforming ones. Initiatives like the Performance Improvement Officers’ Pulse—which tracks enterprise performance outcomes—or the Navy’s World Class Alignment Metrics (WAM)—a transformative approach linking IT investments directly to mission results—demonstrate the power of data to guide decision-making. These frameworks should be scaled and embedded across the DoD. This approach isn’t just about efficiency—it’s about aligning every dollar with mission readiness and operational success.
5. Master the System and Build Strategic Relationships
If you want to deliver results within the DoD’s complex and often rigid budgeting framework, it’s essential to know the process inside and out—and, just as importantly, to know the people involved. Developing a deep understanding of the PPBE process, from the timing of budget cycles to the layers of approvals required, can give you a crucial edge. But even more impactful is building relationships with the key players in the system. Having allies with programmers and budgeters can make a significant difference in navigating bureaucratic challenges. These relationships allow for more effective collaboration, facilitate faster approvals, and help you work around obstacles that might otherwise derail your program. Understanding the process and building a network of supportive colleagues isn’t just advantageous—it’s essential for driving capability delivery in an environment as complex as the DoD.
6. Incentivize Re-Use and Collaboration Over Redundancy
In the DoD, building new programs from scratch for each Military Department is often rewarded, even when existing solutions can meet mission needs and actually work (this is the key point, it has to work). This culture encourages the creation of isolated “fiefdoms” at the expense of overall joint capability. Instead, we must value and incentivize the re-use of existing systems and technologies that are already working well. By rewarding leaders for strengthening, integrating, and enhancing proven programs—rather than building redundant ones—we can maximize efficiency, foster inter-service collaboration, and save time and resources. Prioritizing re-use for things that work over redundancy isn’t just more economical; it’s critical to achieving speed and agility in an era of great power competition.
The bottom line is this: the DoD’s failure to close the cash chain keeps us at risk of being outpaced, outgunned, and outmaneuvered. We need a system that can move money as fast as we need to move troops or technology. This isn’t just a Pentagon problem—Congress must also play a role in fixing these issues. We cannot afford to allow our budgeting system to remain a barrier to national security.